中国如期降息意味着什么

刘颖

This is what two HSBC economists named Julia Wang and Jing Li in Hong Kong wrote last Monday after China announced its lowest GDP growth record, 6.9%, in six years:
    Overall, today’s data point to some signs of stabilisation in the Chinese economy. But challenges remain. We forecast another 25 basis points (0.25 percentage points) policy rate cut and 150 basis points (1.5 percentage points) reserve ratio cut in the remainder of 2015.
    Four days later, on Friday, the People’s Bank of China did just that, announcing a 25 basis point cut in the benchmark lending rate to bring it down to 4.35%, while reserve-requirement ratios for lenders were reduced by 50 basis points.
    The HSBC economists were prescient. But, then again, so was everyone else.
    Economists that Bloomberg surveys predicted back in September that China’s central bank would relax reserve requirements for banks again before the end of 2015 and cut lending rates. The median estimates: the central bank would lower the benchmark lending rate by 0.25% in 2015 and reserve requirements by a full percentage point by the end of 2016.
    So Friday’s news could have been the least surprising in the last year of China’s efforts to speed up the slowing locomotive that is its economy.
    If almost everyone following China expected more interest rate cuts in 2015, yet stock market investors were surprised by the cuts and sent stocks rising (pundits said U.S. stocks rose 1% on the news) , there’s either a disconnect between what’s happening across China and what some observers think is happening, or, more likely, stock markets, which are complex systems, rose on Friday because of reasons beyond China. (The fact that it came only one day after the European Central Bank virtually promising to give markets another sugar rush in December probably didn’t harm, either.)
    For now, what is happening in China? The clearest explanation may be that China’s old growth model—fixed investment— has hit its limit, and its next growth model—consumption–isn’t strong enough to replace it completely. So the government appears to be managing a slowdown so the economy doesn’t come to a standstill, unleashing a series of monetary fixes like interest rate cuts, and fiscal fixes, like infrastructure spending. Lower interest rates allow homebuyers to save some on their mortgages, and also, at the margings, reduce the cost of finance for companies, although it’s hard to see many Chinese companies getting too excited about a 0.25 percent cut when producer prices are falling at an annual rate of nearly 6%, implying a real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) interest rate of over 10%. This is savage debt deflation, and Chinese companies are deeply indebted—corporate debt is more than 150% of GDP, among the highest in the world.
    This is why keeping companies from defaulting won’t help China with its bigger, structural transition. “Cuts in rates mean practically nothing for China’s long-term economic prospects,” writes Gavekal Capital’s Bryce Coward. “…These are cyclical boosts that act as tailwinds to China’s economic train. No amount of wind, save a hurricane, is going to keep the train from slowing.”
    The government is likely fine with a slowdown. But not when those previously mentioned indebted companies might turn a slowdown into something far more serious.
    Sources leaking info from China’s central bank indicate that the government is freaked out now that the slowing economy is imperiling companies. The Wall Street Journal notes that until this summer, it was unusual for China’s central bankers to employ the twin salvo of interest rate cuts and bank reserve ratio requirement cuts, which the bank did on Friday. “A lot of companies have seen their profitability falling sharply and that’s a key reason why we took the action again today,” a ‘senior official’ at the PBOC told the newspaper.
    “Slower growth is part of China’s rebalancing process,” Moody’s credit rating services concluded today.
    But that rebalancing may be anything but smooth for China and world markets, as evidenced Friday, even if economists get all their predictions right.

刘颖

上周一（10月19日），中国政府公布的6.9%的第三季度GDP增长率创下六年新低，汇丰驻香港经济学家王然和李婧随后写道：

    “总的来说，今天的数据表明中国经济有了一些企稳迹象，但挑战依然存在。我们预计，2015年剩余时间内，政策利率将再下调0.25个百分点，存款准备金率也将下调1.5个百分点。”

    四天后，即上周五（10月23日），中国人民银行的双降公告如期而至——金融机构一年期贷款基准利率下调0.25个百分点，降至4.35%，存准率也下调了0.5个百分点。

    这两位汇丰经济学家确有预见性。不过，和以前一样，其他人也是如此。

    9月份，参与彭博调查的经济学家们预测，中国央行将在2015年底前再次降低存准率并下调贷款利率。他们的平均预期是，2015年内贷款基准利率将下调0.25个百分点，2016年底前存准率将下调整整1个百分点。

    因此，纵观一年来中国为扭转经济放缓局面而付出的努力，上周五的消息可能是其中最不让人感到意外的一次。

    几乎所有关注中国的人都认为2015年利率将进一步下调，在这种情况下，如果股市投资者觉得降息出人意料并因此推高股价（有专家表示，这条消息让美国股市上涨了1%），那就意味着要么中国的实际情况和一些观察人士对中国的看法之间存在脱节，要么上周五股市上涨的原因在中国之外。股市是一个复杂的系统，出现后一种情况的可能性更大（就在中国央行宣布双降前一天，欧洲央行实际上已经承诺12月份进一步扩大宽松，再给市场“发糖”，这样的消息当然有益无害）。

    眼下中国情况如何呢？最明了的解释也许是中国原来的增长模式，或者说固定资产投资的作用已经达到了极限；而新的增长模式——消费的驱动作用还不够大，无法完全取代前者。因此，中国政府看来正在控制经济放缓的步伐，以免它陷入停滞，并为此推出了降息等一系列货币政策以及基础设施投资等财政措施。下调利率后，购房者可以少还一些抵押贷款，企业的财务成本也将略有下降。只不过，很难想象会有大批中国公司因为利率下调0.25个百分点而激动不已，因为工业生产者出厂价格指数（PPI）正以每年近6%的速度下滑，意味着对应的实际利率（剔除通胀因素）在10%以上。这是严重的债务紧缩，而中国企业已经债台高筑——公司债务超过中国GDP的150%，在全球已是最高级别。

    正是出于这个原因，不让公司债务违约，无助于中国实施更大的结构性改革。投资咨询公司Gavekal Capital分析师布赖斯·考沃德写道：“降息对中国的长期经济前景实际上毫无影响……这些都是周期性刺激措施，作用是为中国这趟经济列车刮起一阵顺风。但除了飓风，没有什么风能阻止这趟列车慢下来。”

    政府可能觉得放缓没什么问题。但如果上述那些负债累累的公司有可能把经济放缓演变成严重得多的局面，情况就会有所不同了。

    据消息人士透露，从中国央行传出的信息表明，经济减速危及企业让中国政府非常担心。《华尔街日报》指出，今年夏季之前，像上周五那样的双降对中国央行来说一直都是不寻常之举。该报援引一位央行高级官员话说：“许多企业的盈利能力都急剧减弱，这是央行当天再次采取行动的关键性原因。”

    本周二，穆迪信用评级服务得出结论说：“增长放慢是中国经济再平衡过程的一部分。”

    不过，上周五的情况证明，就算经济学家的预测完全正确，但对中国和海外市场来说，中国经济再平衡恐怕绝不会一帆风顺。